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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 900457 
v. : 
TERRY L. HAY, : Priority No, 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of criminal 
homicide, murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (amended 1991).l 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion for a mistrial based on ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel, allegedly resulting from trial counsel's 
failure to introduce the victim's knife into evidence? 
When raised on appeal after trial court proceedings on 
the issue, the question of trial counsel effectiveness is a mixed 
1
 Although section 76-5-203 has since been amended to 
delete the "second degree" classification (this level of criminal 
homicide is now simply called "murder"), the State will refer to 
the offense as "murder in the second degree," in accord with the 
language of the statute in effect at the time of defendant's 
prosecution. 
one of law and fact. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
697-98 (1984) (review following habeas corpus proceeding); State 
v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (reviewing denial of 
new trial motion). Defendant must show both that counsel's 
performance was deficient and that such deficiency was 
prejudicial to defendant. Templin, 805 P.2d at 186. 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial 
misconduct? 
This issue has not been properly preserved for review. 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Utah 1989); State v. Cobb, 
774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989) (grounds for an objection must be 
specifically and distinctly stated in the trial court before this 
Court will review such claim on appeal). 
3. Did trial counsel's failure to object to allegedly 
gruesome evidence constitute ineffective assistance of counsel? 
Where first raised on appeal, the question of 
effectiveness of trial counsel is one of law, in that only the 
record of the original trial is examined. State v. Humphries, 
818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). Defendant must show both that 
counsel's performance was deficient and that such deficiency was 
prejudicial to defendant. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 
(Utah 1990). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with criminal homicide, murder in 
the second degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990), including a firearm enhancement 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1990) (R. 6-7). 
Following a four day jury trial defendant was convicted 
as charged (R. 167). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of five 
years to life in the young adult facility at the Utah State 
Prison, which sentence was to run concurrent with an additional 
one year, firearm enhancement term (R. 223). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Victim's Body Discovered 
Responding to a tip from some rabbit hunters on 
December 31, 1989, Detective Scott Carter, of the Utah County 
Sheriff's Office, investigated the discovery of a "skeletonized 
body" in a remote area near Utah Lake (Transcript of Jury Trial, 
July 10, 1990 [Tl.] 22). The corpse was discovered lying on top 
of a sleeping bag, on top of a wood board, dressed in "biker 
shorts," Levi's and a single black cowboy boot on the left foot 
(Tl. 25-27). A sock containing the remains of the right foot was 
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located on top of the torso, near the shoulders (Transcript of 
Jury Trial, July 13, 1990 [T4.] at 534). 
B. Autopsy Indicates Homicide 
Dr. Sharon Schnittker, an assistant director for the 
Utah State Medical Examiner, autopsied the unidentified corpse on 
January 1, 1990 (Transcript of Jury Trial, July 11, 1990 [T2.] at 
201). Dr. Schnittker recovered two bullets from within the skull 
cap and observed two entrance wounds slightly to the right of the 
middle back of the skull (T2. 202). From the beveling of the 
entrance wounds, Dr. Schnittker was able to determine the bullet 
trajectories were "slightly from right to left . . . and slightly 
downward toward [ the ] feet,f (T2. 206). Dr. Schnittker further 
determined "that the muzzle of the gun held by the shooter [came] 
from the back of the decedent, pointing toward the front of the 
decedent, so [that the bullets entered] the back of the head" 
(T2. 208). Based on these estimations, and the positioning of 
the entrance wounds (within five/eighths of an inch of each 
other), Dr. Schnittker determined that at the time the shots were 
fired the victim's head was "lying on the ground, or in some way 
in a fixed position" (T2. 219). Thus, it was "most likely [that] 
the victim was lying down and the shooter standing over the 
victimf,]" and the victim's head was either "face down 
completely, or turned slightly to the right" (T2. 220). 
Additionally, Dr. Schnittker discovered a separate 
fracture, unconnected to the bullet wounds, on the right side of 
the skull, along the upper eyebrow ridge or zygoma, and the 
4 
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caused by a severe, blunt force trauma |T,' 1* 1L-21 3) She was 
unable to determine whether the skull fracture occurred before or 
iijfc-dti in in ;„ M t i . 
. Based on her autopsy findings, Dr Schnittker concluded 
that the death was=i a homicide, caused by the two gunshots to the 
victin " B - - |'i: . Jl,l I I , 
Victim Identified as Hissing Person, Lony Crosby 
The corpse wa s s ubseguently i,den 1:1 f i ed a s t ha t i f 18 
year uld Lony Crosby„ WJJI had been reported as missing sim n 
August 2, 1989, when he failed to return with defendant from a 
!':\fiiTifi)i I'i'j "l/i" 11? I li 1 • IM '1 I .-"ill,in I « Wu" I ' | I I "I Trai ls- i, i 
o f J u r y T r i a l , J u L \ K , 1 L I U U | 1 J , | a L J ^ l | , 
L o n y ' s g r a n d p a r e n t s , A r l e n p a tin I I n l m f r n s b y , l a s t ' - M M 
I ii I mi in y nil 1 mi i lull in li I n • in mi in i I  i li > 11,MI ml in in ill 11- in I  i i I I  lllii i mi Inl i in I i I  in i in mi in mi li I  in 1 1 
J u l y 1989. The morning of August, I, 1 Ll H M , lony1*' g r a n d f a t h e r 
took defendant anrl hony ITUM in ni neighbor* n proper ty tn win I mi 
A fpnno i I I I i u» ^  r e t u r n e d to tJie i i nome around 1.1 •JO 
i lunch I "I ' 2561 . Af ter lunch, del - I Lony packed 
- : ill II | i e p a i f i II II i | I in in l t i n t iiiii| I I n > mi miiii I ri i I I I Illiiiiiiiiii I , 
- > u . * - i - u e C r o s b y h o m e a L a p p i u x i m a t e l y I ' III |i iiiiiii i| I I I I |i 
Lony => g r a n d f a t h e r observed t h a t both boys had knives (T2, ibUj , 
L a t e * f t e r n oi m HI r ipnnm i in« M *j I y II in , II i< 111 „i ' 
grandfather heard two rapid shots f i reo a ^m the mountains 
w e s t o f h i s h o m p ( T ? ? S / | A p p r o x i m a t e ] o u r l a t e r , 
c l e i e i J H J d i i I  in nil iiii iii m I I  Il li I i ^ ( j . .i,1")) , 
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When Lony's grandmother asked him where Lony was, defendant said 
that he was up in Wales Canyon, "getting their dinner" (T2. 246). 
Defendant then went inside the Crosby's trailer and collected the 
rest of his things (T2. 247). When Lony's grandmother asked him 
how he intended to get back up the mountain with all of his 
stuff, defendant told her that Lony was going to meet him halfway 
(T2. 247). Defendant then took off toward the mountain (T2. 
247). Neither Mr. or Mrs. Crosby saw defendant or Lony again 
(T2. 247). 
When defendant returned to Salt Lake City on August 1, 
1989, the first person he visited was Lony's girlfriend, Jennifer 
Bratt, whom defendant had also dated (T2. 270). He arrived at 
Jennifer's house between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. (T2. 270). When 
Jennifer asked him where Lony was, defendant told her that Lony 
had hit him over the head with a rock and left, taking the gun 
and their knives (T2. 270). Jennifer, who saw no sign of injury, 
reached to feel the bump on defendant's head, but he would not 
let her touch it (T2. 271). Defendant speculated that Lony had 
gone to Reno to be with his ex-girlfriend (T2. 271). 
Jennifer saw defendant again the next day at school and 
again asked where Lony was (T2. 272). Defendant told her that he 
had talked to Lony and that Lony had hitchhiked to Reno (T2. 
272). Jennifer and defendant remained good friends and began to 
date seriously on September 17, 1990 (T2. 273). Almost every day 
defendant told Jennifer that he loved her (T2. 273). Although 
they talked about Lony often, and defendant told Jennifer that 
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The second person defendant talked to upon his return 
t o Sail t Lake was hi n t r i e n d , 'Tn i M I:I IPearee (MM "Ill 111) lieil i r i i d a u l 
walked i n t o T r a v i s ' s yard e a r l y on the morning of August I1' 198y 
( Il"" I , I l l l ) , I J'lioii I'I riv,i n rii'iki-'id d e f e n d a n t w h e r e L o n y i W L , defendant 
t o l d him t h a t he had been camping with Lon.y and t h a t while he was 
s l e e p i n g , Lony s t o l e $30 and a .22 r i f l e from him, and left; (MM 
'Ill II iSpf" LI I ml I "1- Il I, III Ill" I 1 111 i Ihl I Il I I l l l ! I I1! | Il "I Ml fri'f "OTIS. I INI 
and said that he (defendant) \ an n II is way to talk to Lorry's 
mother (T3. 402). Over the next few months, Travis often 
Prior to traveling to Wales with Lony, defendant had 
told Jennifer that he didn't like the way Lony treated her, and 
that she was crazy to go back to him (T2. 309). Defendant also 
sent her flowers and asked Jennifer not to go back tc • Lony (T2 
309), 
Additionally, a t trial, defendant denied developing a 
romantic interest in Jennifer until approximately one month after 
the homicide (T3. 439, 467). However, when asked by the 
prosecutor, defendant admitted it was possible he had written 
Jennifer a letter before the homicide in which he declared: 
1 wisl I 1 could only tell you how much I ] • :: v e 
you. I have always waited for the right 
girl, and I found her. But I tried to tell 
you you're the one, you're the one. It's so 
hard to say it to you because you're so sweet 
and heartful [sic]. . Well, better stop 
and let you do your school work. Remember 
I'll always love you no matter what. I just 
wish I could see you every day, but someday 
soon I'll be back and hopefully, we'll be , . 
• able to go out for a little bit. I'll 
always wait for you and I hope you'll do the 
same. Well, got to go. P.S.: Don't tell 
nobody, please. I love you more than words 
could say. Love you, S3 i ck Love, Terry. 
(T3. 495-96). 
inquired if defendant had heard from Lony and defendant replied 
that he had talked to Lony on the phone and that Lony was in Reno 
(T3. 403). 
Lois Crosby, Lony's mother, talked to defendant later 
on the morning of August 2, 1989 (T3. 318). When Mrs. Crosby 
asked where her son was, defendant said he didn't know (T3. 319). 
Defendant told her that while they were camping, Lony started 
acting strangely and talking about thumbing to Wisconsin (T3. 
320). Mrs. Crosby asked why her son would go to Wisconsin and 
defendant said he didn't know, but promised that he would find 
him (T3. 320, 334). Mrs. Crosby observed that defendant was a 
little nervous, but mostly tired and sunburned (T3. 320). 
Defendant called Mrs. Crosby at approximately 2:30 p.m. 
and said that Lony had been seen in Mapleton, Utah, the night 
before in a big white truck, and that he had been saying good-bye 
to the people he knew there (T3. 320-21). 
Defendant stopped by the Crosby home again around 5:30 
p.m. (T3. 321). He "was smoking a lot of cigarettes, being 
shaky, kind of moving up and down out of his chair, crying, just 
very, very — kind of fell apart deal [sic]" (T3. 321). 
Defendant told Mrs. Crosby that he "took a nap, and when he woke 
up Lony was gone. He just — poof — disappeared" (T3. 321). 
Lony's father similarly observed that defendant was visibly 
shaken (T3. 337). "He would stand up and sit down a lot, moved 
[sic] his hands across the table and was chain smoking" (T3. 
337). Mrs. Crosby asked whether they had gotten into a fight and 
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defendant said they had, but she observed no signs of injury on 
him (T3. 322). 
After talking to defendant on the evening of August 2f 
1989, Lony's father contacted Paul Reich, a Deputy Salt Lake 
County Sheriff (T3. 338). Officer Reich interviewed defendant 
that same night at the Crosby residence (T3. 340). Defendant 
told Officer Reich that it was approximately 6:00 p.m. when he 
and Lony got up the mountain and that he took a nap (T3. 342). 
When he awakened at approximately 7:15 p.m., defendant claimed 
that Lony was gone (T3. 342). Additionally, defendant told the 
officer that he and Lony had been friends for a long time and 
that they had had no problems on the trip (T3. 342). 
Officer Reich spoke with defendant again approximately 
one-half hour later at defendant's home (T3. 342). Defendant 
first stuck by his original story (T3. 343). However, when 
Officer Reich informed defendant that he didn't think his story 
made sense, defendant broke down and became very emotional (T3. 
343). With tears in his eyes, defendant told Officer Reich that 
he had promised Lony "not to tell, . . . and didn't want to break 
his promise to Lony, . . . not to tell where [Lony] was or what 
he was doing" (T3. 343). Defendant then told the officer that 
Lony had run away to Nevada where he was going to get a job (T3. 
344). Defendant also told Officer Reich that they had stolen a 
truck to return from Wales, and that he had last seen Lony when 
he dropped him off at the Draper exit on 1-15, at approximately 
12200 South (T3. 344). 
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Over the course of the next several months, defendant 
continued to represent that he was in touch with Lony and that 
Lony was well. Mrs. Crosby called defendant approximately two or 
three times a day to see if had heard from Lony (T3. 323, 332). 
Defendant told her that Lony had called him twice and was doing 
fine, and that he had asked Lony to call her (T3. 323). However, 
defendant never told Mrs. Crosby where her son was (T3. 323). 
Although defendant agreed to assist the Crosbys in a search of 
the Wales area, he failed to show up at the time of the search, 
which was conducted two weeks after Lony's disappearance (T3. 
324). 
A mutual friend of defendant and Lony, Kendall Davis, 
was present on one occasion when Mrs. Crosby telephoned (T3. 388-
89). Kendall observed how upset the call made defendant and felt 
badly for him (T3. 392). Defendant said, "If somebody would call 
them, or something like that, to — you know, just let them know 
that you talked to him, because they trust you. They believe 
you" (T3. 388-89). Although he had not talked to Lony since his 
disappearance, Kendall subsequently made such a call on 
defendant's behalf (T3. 389). 
Detective Peter Godfrey of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office interviewed defendant as part of his 
investigation of Lony's disappearance (T3. 406, 408). Defendant 
repeated essentially the same story he had told Officer Reich and 
Lony's family and friends about Lony going to Reno (T3. 406-09). 
Detective Godfrey contacted several motels in Reno, but found no 
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record of Lony (T3. 408). Additionally, defendant told Detective 
Godfrey that he dropped the stolen truck off at 4500 South and 
then contacted the authorities as to its location (T3. 410). 
C. Defendant Suspected 
After reviewing police reports surrounding Lony's 
disappearance, Detective Carter began to suspect defendant in the 
homicide and brought him in for questioning on January 2, 1990 
(Tl. 28-29). Defendant said he had known Lony for about 10 years 
and that he and Lony had gone camping in Wales, Utah in late July 
1989 (Tl. 32). They stayed at Lony's grandparent's trailer where 
they performed odd jobs and went rabbit hunting (Tl. 32). 
Defendant told the detective that he and Lony stole a truck for 
their return trip to Salt Lake City on August 1, 1992 (Tl. 33). 
According to defendant, they exited 1-15 at 90th South and Lony, 
who had "family problems," said he didn't want to go home, so 
defendant left him there, near an empty field (Tl. 33). When 
Detective Carter informed defendant that his story was 
inconsistent with other facts he had uncovered, defendant "slid 
down in his chair[,] sobbed," and confessed that he was 
responsible for Lony's death (Tl. 35). 
1. Defendant Claims the Homicide Occurred in 
Murray, Utah 
Defendant told Detective Carter that after he and Lony 
returned from Wales, they decided to camp out in an empty field 
near Lony's parents home in Murray, Utah (Tl. 35). They set up a 
camp with their sleeping bags and were sitting around talking 
when they got into an argument over Jennifer (Tl. 37). Defendant 
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claimed that Lony confronted him with the fact that defendant had 
slept with Jennifer and then came at him with a knife (Tl. 37). 
Defendant reached for his rifle, pointed it at Lony, and it 
discharged (Tl. 37). When asked for more details, defendant said 
he could not remember "the exact way" the shooting occurred or 
where the bullets hit Lony; however, he did recall that Lony was 
about 10 feet away at the time (Tl. 37-38). He further recalled 
that after the gun went off, Lony fell to the ground (Tl. 38). 
According to defendant, he then fled to his parent's 
house to get his father's truck (Tl. 39). He parked the truck 
approximately 75 feet away from Lony's house and then pulled 
Lony's body on a sleeping bag to the truck where he lifted it 
into the back (Tl. 40). Defendant used the wood racks off the 
side of the truck to cover the body (Tl. 40). Defendant then 
drove to Utah County where he dumped Lony's body near Utah Lake 
(Tl. 41). 
Following defendant's explanation for the homicide, 
Detective Carter turned him over to Murray City Detective, Jeff 
Anderson, for further questioning (Tl. 48-49). Detective 
Anderson interviewed defendant in the early morning hours of 
January 3, 1990 (Tl. 69-70). At that time, defendant appeared 
alert and responsive, but somewhat quiet and depressed (Tl. 71). 
Defendant told Detective Anderson that he and Lony had driven a 
four wheel ATV as far as Mapleton, Utah, and then hitchhiked the 
rest of the way to Wales (Tl. 71). He said they returned from 
Wales in a truck on either July 31, 1989, or August 1, 1989 (Tl. 
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72). According to defendant, he parked the truck on 4500 South, 
by the Jordan Queen, and left Lony there while he went over to 
Jennifer's house to let her know they were back (Tl. 72-73). 
When defendant returned to the truck, he and Lony gathered their 
belongings and walked to a field near the Crosby home located at 
approximately 4850 South, 400 West, just north of the Galleria 
(Tl. 73). 
Defendant claimed that he and Lony put their sleeping 
bags down, talked about getting some beer and eventually walked 
to a nearby Circle K where they stole a case of beer off of a 
delivery truck (Tl. 74). After they had each drunk 11 cans of 
beer, defendant said he and Lony began to talk about Jennifer, 
and Lony got "extremely violent and upset" (Tl. 75). Lony 
started "yelling and screaming," and "grabbed" a knife from his 
backpack (Tl. 75-76). Defendant claimed that Lony started coming 
towards him, making verbal threats and swinging his knife within 
two feet of him (Tl. 76-77). Defendant grabbed his rifle, a .22 
caliber semi-automatic and held it at his hip with the barrel 
pointed upwards (Tl. 77, 188-89). Defendant claimed the rifle 
discharged because his fingers were shaking (Tl. 77, 188-89). 
According to defendant, Lony swung the knife, stumbled and spun 
before he fired (Tl. 192). After the shooting, defendant noted 
that Lony had fallen to the ground motionless (Tl. 79). 
Defendant called Lony's name, but received no response (Tl. 79). 
Scared and frightened, defendant said he wanted to hide Lony's 
body, and to run away from it (Tl. 143). Defendant claimed that 
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the rifle was loaded because they had been rabbit hunting (Tl. 
194). 
Additionally, defendant told Detective Anderson that 
after dumping Lony's body near Utah Lake he returned to Murray 
and threw Lony's backpack and the knife Lony had threatened him 
with in a nearby creek (Tl. 81). He described Lony's knife as 
having a 12 inch long fixed blade with a black and red handle 
(Tl. 81). Defendant subsequently took Murray City detectives to 
the field where he claimed the homicide occurred and, while the 
officers videotaped the scene, attempted to demonstrate what had 
happened (Tl. 84) 
2. Evidence that the Homicide Occurred in 
Wales, Utah 
At the request of Detective Anderson, Arlene Crosby 
searched the area near her Wales, Utah home, where she believed 
Lony and defendant had camped (T2. 248). During that search she 
found a cowboy boot, in a bush, 2-3 feet off the ground (T2. 249-
50). 
Detective Anderson traveled to Wales to investigate the 
boot on January 9, 1990 (Tl. 84-85). The back of the boot, which 
was similar to the boot found with Lony's body, had been opened 
from the heel up, with a smooth edge (Tl. 102-03, T2. 154-55). 
As part of his investigation, Detective Anderson also searched 
the foothills west of the Crosby residence where he found two .22 
casings and a knife (Tl. 84-85, 88). He also observed a shallow 
hole, covered with broken branches (Tl. 92). 
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D. Defendant's Story 
At trial, for the first time, defendant admitted that 
the homicide had actually occurred in Wales, Utah (T3. 446). 
Defendant claimed that he told Detectives Carter and Anderson 
that the shooting occurred in Murray because he "didn't want to 
be around them (the officers)," and because "that's where we both 
lived. I just didn't want to believe it, so I just, you know, 
thought of something and said it" (T3. 466). 
1. Defendant Claims He Acted in Self defense 
According to defendant's trial testimony, he and Lony 
headed up Wales canyon after having lunch with Lony's 
grandparents on August 1, 1989 (T3. 441). They took sleeping 
bags, backpacks, defendant's gun and their knives (T3. 441). 
They each had two knives, one they kept in their individual 
pockets and one they kept in their individual backpacks (T3. 
441). According to defendant they intended to use his gun to 
shoot some rabbits for dinner (T3. 442). 
When they arrived at the campsite, defendant claimed 
that he went looking for food while Lony dug a fire pit (T3. 
442). When defendant returned to the campsite, he and Lony began 
to talk about Jennifer (T3. 443). According to defendant, Lony 
said something about wishing Jennifer were there for "sexual 
purposes," and he (defendant) just "chuckled" (T3. 443-444). 
Defendant further claimed that they were "just sitting there" 
when "Lony jumped and said[,] 'I can't believe you did it'" (T3. 
443). Defendant "looked at him, [and] told him, . . . 'Well, you 
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know, it's over, you know. Forget about it, it's past tense'"3 
(T3. 443). Lony then "got in his bag and grabbed a knife," and 
"said that he wanted to kill [him]" (T3. 443, 446). Defendant 
claimed that he picked up his gun "just to scare [Lony] off and 
frighten him and make him stop" (T3. 445). Defendant said Lony 
"swung the knife once," then he "went into a spin, into a fall, . 
. . and the next thing you know, the gun goes off" (T3. 446). 
Defendant claimed his hands were "shaking" as he held the gun and 
that he "didn't know what to do" (T3. 447). He estimated that 
Lony was two feet away at the time he shot him, but he didn't 
"pay attention" to Lony's position when he fell (T3. 447). 
Additionally, he claimed to remember firing only one shot (T3. 
448). 
After the shooting, defendant observed that "Lony was 
laying [sic] down on the ground and [defendant] hollered at him 
once and [Lony] didn't move" (T3. 448). Defendant "picked up the 
bottom of the sleeping bag and drug [sic] it over to Lony, and 
dug this [sic] hole" (T3. 448). He then "moved [Lony's body] 
over to that [sic] hole, . . . and kicked dirt over it," because 
he "didn't want to see it" (T3. 448). Although defendant claimed 
that Lony dug the pit to cook their dinner, it was approximately 
five feet long, three feet wide and one foot deep (T3. 484). 
3
 Defendant believed Lony was referring to the fact that 
he had slept with Jennifer (T3. 436-438). Although defendant 
never talked to Lony about the fact that he had slept with 
Jennifer (T3. 438), defendant was aware that Jennifer had told 
Lony about the incident (T3. 436-437). 
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Defendant claimed that he "didn't pay no attention" to 
where he shot Lony (T3. 483), and never looked to see where the 
bullets were in Lony's body (T3. 448). Additionally, even though 
Lony wore his hair closely shaved (T3. 484), and fell on his 
stomach after the shooting (T3. 483)/ defendant claimed he never 
observed the bullet wounds in the back of Lony's head (T3. 483-
84). Nor did he notice any blood (T3. 504). 
After dumping Lony's body in the pit, defendant 
gathered up their camping gear and "threw" the knife and "some 
other things" as he ran down the hill (T3. 449). Defendant did 
not recall talking to Lony's grandmother, but admitted that it 
could have happened (T3. 450). He did recall stealing a truck 
and driving to Salt Lake City where he arrived shortly before 
dark (T3. 451). Defendant hid Lony's things in a barn behind 
Lony's house where he spent the night (T3. 452). 
2. Defendant Refuses to Believe that Lony is Dead 
Defendant explained that he had lied to Lony's family 
and friends about Lony's whereabouts because "[he] didn't want to 
believe that Lony was dead" (T3. 454). Rather, he wanted to 
believe "that Lony did leave [sic]f [that] he went to Reno or 
someplace. I wanted to believe that he was still alive" (T3. 
456). In the months following the homicide and before the 
discovery of Lony's remains, defendant claimed that he never 
thought about the shooting, rather "[he] just thought Lony was 
out of town, [that] he went to Reno" (T3. 464). 
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Defendant said he returned to the scene of the shooting 
approximately six weeks later, in the middle of the night, "to 
prove to [himself] that it didn't happen" (T3. 457). He 
described seeing the sleeping bag, picking it up and carrying it 
down to his father's truck (T3. 458, 491). Although Lony's 
decomposed body was resting on top of the sleeping bag, defendant 
did not acknowledge looking at or otherwise noticing its 
decomposed state (T3. 458-59, 488, 491, 504). Rather, he 
persisted in his belief that the shooting had not occurred (T3. 
458). Defendant further claimed that he "[didn't know] and 
"didn't pay no attention" to whether Lony's right foot came off 
when he attempted to move the body to Utah Lake (T3. 489). 
Although the homicide occurred in Sanpete County, 
defendant was prosecuted in Salt Lake County, based on his 
representations, prior to trial, that the homicide had occurred 
in Murray, Utah (Tl. 6). 
Other evidence will be discussed as it is pertinent to 
specific points. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of 
trial counsel. Although trial counsel's conduct was arguably 
deficient in failing to introduce the victim's knife during 
trial, defendant's theory of self defense was adequately 
presented to the jury. Additionally, the victim's knife was 
ultimately presented to the jury during their deliberations, 
along with defendant's theory of its importance as corroborative 
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of his version of the homicide. Thus, defendant has failed to 
demonstrate any unfair prejudice. 
As for defendant's assertion that the prosecutor 
concealed and withheld the victim's knife in violation of due 
process, it is complete speculation, devoid of record support and 
should be rejected. Moreover, the issue has not been properly 
preserved for review. 
Finally, defendant was not denied the effective 
assistance of trial counsel when counsel failed to object to 
allegedly improper cross-examination by the prosecutor. Although 
the trial court had previously cautioned the parties to avoid the 
gruesome aspects of defendant's movement of the victim's corpse, 
it became necessary for the prosecutor to confront defendant with 
the arguably gruesome realities of his actions when defendant 
alleged that he did not believe the victim was dead, even after 
having moved the decomposing corpse from the homicide scene to 
Utah Lake. Moreover, even without the arguably gruesome 
testimony, the jury had substantial evidence from which to infer 
that defendant was not credible, and that his version of events 




DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT TRIAL 
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO INTRODUCE THE VICTIM'S 
KNIFE INTO EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL DEPRIVED HIM 
OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL; NOR 
HAS HE ESTABLISHED ANY PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT 
A. Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel 
Defendant alleges that he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not offer the 
victim's knife into evidence during trial (Br. of App. at 10-13). 
Apparently, trial counsel was operating under the assumption that 
the victim's knife had not been discovered and was therefore 
unavailable (Transcript of Jury Trial, July 13, 1990 [T4.] at 
576). However, after the jury was excused to deliberate, trial 
counsel observed the victim's knife in the prosecutor's briefcase 
and brought the matter to the attention of the trial court with a 
motion for a mistrial (T4. 592). In so moving, trial counsel 
acknowledged that she may have been apprised of the knife's 
existence through discovery (T4. 592-93). If so, trial counsel 
indicated that she was 
simply rais[ing] the issue for appeal 
purposes on the grounds of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, because in [her] 
obvious haste to prepare for the trial . . . 
[she] did not catch the fact that that knife 
existed, which would [have corroborated her] 
client's story. 
(T4. 593). Trial counsel further clarified that she was "not 
alleging that [the State] hid [the knife] from [her]" (T4. 594). 
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In considering trial counsel's motion, the court 
suggested that the parties stipulate to the knife's admission 
(T4. 597). Trial counsel urged the court to grant her mistrial 
motion, but acknowledged that if the court had determined to deny 
the motion, she preferred that the matter be cured by stipulation 
(T4. 597). The court indicated that it would not grant the 
motion for mistrial "unless there's [sic] good ground for it, 
[a]nd if there's [sic] a way to cure things, there's [sic] not 
good ground for a mistrial" (T4. 598). 
The parties ultimately came up with a stipulation in 
which each party briefly stated the knife's "significance" to 
their individual theories of the case (T4. 600-01). Prior to the 
court reading the stipulation to the deliberating jurors, trial 
counsel again expressed her concern that "it would have been a 
lot more effective if [she] could have asked [defendant] to 
identify [the knife], if [she] could have argued and gone on and 
on about the credibility, just to that extent" (T4. 602). The 
court responded that 
[n]o one is entitled to a perfect trial. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair trial. And in 
fact the way this has occurred may have been 
much more effective for your client than any 
other way. The jury is going to look upon it 
as something they never expected, either 
manna from heaven or elsewhere, and I think 
it could well be more effective in your 
behalf because of the stipulation of the 
parties and my consideration of it. 
(T4. 602). The court then read the following stipulation to the 
jurors: 
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Members of the jury, we're going to do 
something a little bit out of the ordinary. 
I'm going to, at this time, receive Exhibits 
42 and 43. 43 is a knife; 42 is a map of the 
area of search [sic], or the area that we 
have been talking about in Sanpete County, 
with a designation of 42 on the map, with a 
red "X" in the lower left-hand side of the 
map indicating where the knife, Exhibit 43, 
was found. 
There was a knife in existence and 
neither party established foundation for its 
admissibility into evidence during the trial 
proper. Both parties have agreed, however, 
that the knife should be admitted at this 
time for consideration by the jury in its 
deliberations. It's a knife with a black 
handle trimmed in red, found in late August 
or early September 1989, and marked as 
Exhibit 43-S by a member of the Sanpete 
Search and Rescue organization, and found, as 
I indicated, at a place designated by the red 
"X" on the diagram, which is Exhibit 42-S. 
The State claims the following from this 
evidence: This knife was located 121 feet 
south of where the cut boot was located. 
State contends this knife was probably used 
to cut said boot. 
The defendant claims the following from 
this evidence: That is, the knife matches 
[defendant's] description of the knife used 
by Lony Crosby. The knife was located south 
of the campsite where Lony Crosby was shot. 
[Defendant] testified that he threw the knife 
to the south. 
(T4. 603-04) (a complete copy of the pertinent transcript pages 
is contained in Addendum A). On appeal defendant alleges that 
the trial court's "cure" was an inadequate "remedy" and that he 
was unfairly prejudiced as a result (Br. of App. at 12). 
1. Defendant's Burden to Establish Prejudice 
A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must show both that counsel rendered a 
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deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and that a 
reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the result of the trial would have been different. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. 
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 
401, 405 (Utah 1986). A "[d]efendant must prove that specific, 
identified acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance. The claim may not be 
speculative, but must be a demonstrative realityf.]M Frame, 723 
P.2d at 405. And, the deficient performance must be so 
prejudicial as to "undermine confidence in the reliability of the 
verdict." Ibid. If defendant fails to satisfy his burden of 
showing that he was unfairly prejudiced as a result of the 
alleged deficiency, this Court need not determine whether 
counsel's performance in not introducing Lony's knife during the 
course of trial was deficient. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 119 
(Utah 1989). 
2. Defendant Was Not Prejudiced by Trial 
Counsel's Performance 
Instead of making the required, specific showing of 
prejudice, defendant simply asserts, in conclusory fashion, that 
if trial counsel had introduced the knife into evidence, "he 
could have developed a sounder theory" of self defense, and 
"enhanced [his] credibility!;.]" (Br. of App. 11). Defendant 
levels these allegations with no discussion of the defense 
actually presented by trial counsel, and does not articulate how 
it was prejudicial beyond his speculative, unsupported assertion 
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that trial counsel's failure to introduce the knife "compromised 
his defense" (Br. of App. 13). 
In an analogous case, the Utah Court of Appeals 
recently recognized that a "failure to make a motion for 
discovery does not constitute per se ineffective assistance" 
where a review of the record demonstrates that counsel 
"investigated the case through methods other than by a formal 
discovery motion." State v. Vigil, 197 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 
(Utah App. October 7, 1992). Similarly, trial counsel's failure 
to introduce the victim's knife into evidence during the course 
of trial should not constitute per se ineffective assistance 
because a review of the record demonstrates that trial counsel 
adequately presented defendant's theory of self defense to the 
jury. 
In addition to defendant's testimony that he shot in 
self defense (T4. 445-47), trial counsel introduced the testimony 
of pathologist Edwin Sweeney, to the effect that the entrance 
wounds on Lony's skull were not consistent with an execution type 
killing, and that it was possible the wounds occurred while Lony 
was "stepping forward and turning" (T4. 525-26). In her cross-
examination of assistant medical examiner, Sharon Schnittker, 
trial counsel similarly established that while it was "most 
likely" that Lony's head was stationary at the time of the 
shooting, Dr. Schnittker could not say so with "absolute 
certainty" (T2. 227). Further, in her cross-examination of 
Jennifer Bratt, trial counsel established that Lony was 
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"extremely jealous" of Jennifer's relationship with defendant 
(T2. 291), and that Lony had told Jennifer that he would "kill" 
defendant "some day" (T2. 292). 
Additionally, trial counsel used the fact that Lony's 
knife was not in evidence to enhance defendant's credibility. 
Specifically, the State introduced a knife found near the scene 
of the shooting, but which did not match defendant's description 
of the knife Lony had allegedly threatened him with (Tl. 88-91). 
During her examination of defendant, trial counsel asked, "If you 
were making up a lie, wouldn't it be easier just to say that you 
took the knife with you?" (T3. 506). Defendant responded 
affirmatively and also indicated that he did not know whether the 
police had found the knife that he had described (T3. 506). 
During her closing argument, trial counsel made the most of the 
missing knife, asking the jury to consider that if it was true 
defendant had lied about "crucial elements of what happened, why 
didn't he lie and say that, yes, [the knife introduced by the 
prosecutor] was [Lony's] knife?" (T4. 576). 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Lony's knife 
was ultimately presented to the jury, along with defendant's 
theory of its importance as corroborative of his version of the 
homicide (T4. 604, see Addendum A). 
In light of the foregoing, defendant's speculations on 
appeal are simply insufficient to establish that the trial 
court's cure was inadequate to remedy the minor, if any, 
prejudice he suffered as a result of trial counsel's alleged 
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deficiency. Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. He has not shown how the 
evidence amassed on either side might have been so altered by an 
error of trial counsel that "the entire evidentiary picture" 
would have been affected. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 
B. The Prosecutor's Conduct was Appropriate 
As for defendant's assertion that the prosecutor 
concealed and withheld Lony's knife in violation of due process 
(Br. of App. at 13-18), it is complete speculation, devoid of 
record support and should be rejected. See Koulis v. Standard 
Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah App. 1987) ("'This Court need 
not, and will not, consider any facts not properly cited to, or 
supported by, the record.'" (quoting Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l 
Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978)); Utah R. App. P. 
24 (e). See also State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984) 
("This Court will not rule on matters outside the trial court 
record."). Moreover, the issue has not been properly preserved 
for review. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989) (grounds for an 
objection must be specifically and distinctly stated in the trial 
court before this Court will review such claim on appeal). As 
noted in Part A, supra, trial counsel clarified that she was not 
alleging that the State "hid" the knife from her: "To that 
extent I take responsibility" (T4. 594). Thus, the State 
declines to address, and the Court should not consider, 
defendant's assertion that the State was obligated to introduce 
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the knife into evidence, or otherwise bring it to trial counsel's 
attention (Br. of App. at 15). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT TRIAL 
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO ALLEGED 
IMPROPER EVIDENCE DEPRIVED HIM OF THE 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to 
"[e]xclude [e]vidence . . . regarding [his] transportation of the 
victim's corpse" (R. 62, 255, Transcript of final pretrial 
hearing, July 2, 1990, [PT.] at 14). Defendant argued that the 
evidence was neither relevant nor probative of his state of mind 
at the time of the homicide, and that even if it was relevant, 
the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any 
probative value (R. 255-56, PT. 14-15). 
Finding that the evidence was relevant "to the issue of 
credibility," the trial court denied defendant's motion, "insofar 
as it depends on relevance[.]" (R. 260, PT. 19). In addressing 
the balancing test of rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, the Court 
inquired what the nature of defendant's concerns were: 
Is the only inflammatory portion that you're 
claiming, . . .is, that the act happened, 
and that he, [defendant], moved the body? Is 
that the only inflammatory thing you are 
claiming, or is it in [sic] your concern 
about evidence [sic] about how he moved the 
body and the condition of the body at the 
time, and its decayed state? What is it 
you're concerned about? 
(R. 261, PT. 20). Trial counsel responded that they were only 
"concerned about him having moved the body[,]" and "that the 
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State [could] avoid that issue and have plenty of evidence to 
proceed on" (R. 261, PT. 20). 
The trial court then ruled as follows: 
All right. I have previously determined 
that the evidence in question is relevant. 
And given the fact that what this case is 
going to be about is self defense, the 
credibility of [defendant] is highly 
relevant. Rule 403 requires that in order 
for evidence to be excluded, the probative 
value must be substantial, and I emphasize 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice and other things. 
However, in this case the unfair 
prejudice is the only factor that's being 
raised. I'm not persuaded at this time that 
the probative value is substantially — and 
again I emphasize substantially — outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
If we were to get into the issue of some 
gruesome aspects of the movement of the body, 
my ruling would be otherwise. But what we 
have here is merely a question of whether or 
not the body was moved, and if so, was it 
moved by [defendant]. 
And what did [defendant] — and what did 
[defendant] say about that on prior 
occasions. Because that's the limited issue, 
the motion is denied. 
(R. 262-63, PT. 21-22) (complete copies of trial counsel's motion 
and the parties' argument thereon are contained in Addendum B). 
A. Defendant's Allegation of Deficient Performance 
On appeal, defendant asserts that trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to object to gruesome evidence allegedly 
admitted in violation of the court's ruling (Br. of App. at 18-
20). Specifically, defendant complains that trial counsel should 
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have objected to certain portions of the prosecutor's cross-
examination of defendant concerning his movement of Lony's body: 
Q. By this point you're up there in the 
middle of the night and you have got Lony's 
body, which has been decomposing for a month 
and a half; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's a terrible sight? 
A. I didn't look. 
Q. You didn't look? Did you notice anything 
about it? 
A. Just sleeping bag and dirt. 
Q. Well, there was a terrible smell, wasn't 
there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it was in awful condition, wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. To a point where it would almost be 
falling apart at various limbs and that type 
of thing, correct? 
A. Yes, it could have been. 
Q. Something might break apart? 
A. Probably could have, yes. 
• • • 
Q. When you pulled him out, his foot broke 
apart, didn't it? 
A. I don't know? 
Q. You don't remember? 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. If his foot broke apart, you would be 
sitting there holding the boot in your hand, 
correct? 
A. I didn't pay no attention. 
Q. You didn't pay no attention if you had 
his foot in your hand? 
A. No. 
Q. At that point it's possible, isn't it, 
that you wouldn't want to put your hand in 
that boot, correct? 
A. Yes, that would be. 
Q. And so the likely thing to do may be to 
take a knife, cut the back of the boot open 
and take his foot out of the back by the 
sock, correct? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. That wouldn't be the likely thing to do? 
A. I don't know. I wouldn't do it. 
Q. Okay. If you were to do that, then, you 
could lay the foot down on top of him and 
throw the boot away; is that correct? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Is it your testimony, then, that you 
actually picked up a decomposing body that 
had been there six weeks and carried it 100 
yards down a hill covered with dirt? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So you drive him up to the area west of 
Utah Lake and you grab hold of this — not 
this particular one but one of these on that 
other sideboard [sic] — and pull him right 
out of the truck, correct. 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And everything that was there on top of 
him came with it. Basically, the sleeping 
bag and cans and trash and gloves and those 
things were just basically junk in the back 
of your dad's pickup, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It all just came sliding out and landed 
on the ground. And what's the height of a 
pickup, maybe two and a half, three feet? 
Then you jump back in the truck and take off; 
is that right? 
A. Yes. Yes, sir. 
(T3. 488-493) (a complete copy of the pertinent transcript pages 
is contained in Addendum C). 
Additionally, defendant claims it was ineffective for 
trial counsel to stipulate to the following statement read by the 
prosecutor: "It's stipulated that when the remains of Lony 
Crosby were located that his sock was found located on top of his 
torso near the shoulders. Inside that sock were the remains of 
his right foot" (T4. 534). 
Although the trial court cautioned the parties to avoid 
the "gruesome aspects of the movement of the body" (R. 263, PT. 
22, see Addendum B), it is not at all clear that the trial court 
would have sustained an objection to the prosecutor's cross-
examination of defendant on that subject, had such an objection 
been made. As recognized by the trial court, defendant's 
credibility was a crucial issue at trial (R. 262, PT. 21, see 
Addendum B). The apparent purpose of the prosecutor's cross-
examination was to refute defendant's suggestion that he had not 
lied concerning Lony's whereabouts after the homicide because he 
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did not believe that Lony was dead (T3. 449, 454-58, 464), and 
that he persisted in that belief even after he moved Lony's 
decomposing corpse from the homicide scene to Utah Lake (T3. 472-
73, 484-486). In order to demonstrate defendant's lack of 
credibility concerning his refusal to believe that the homicide 
had even occurred, it was both necessary and proper for the 
prosecutor to confront defendant with the arguably gruesome 
realities entailed in moving Lony's decomposing corpse. 
Nonetheless, as noted in Point I, supra, if defendant fails to 
satisfy his burden of showing that he was unfairly prejudiced by 
the alleged deficiency on the part of trial counsel, this Court 
need not determine whether counsel's performance was in fact 
deficient. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 119 (Utah 1989). 
B. Defendant Has Not Shown How He was 
Prejudiced by Trial Counsel's Performance 
As in Point I of his brief, defendant again fails to 
make the required, specific showing of prejudice. State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). Rather, defendant asserts, 
in conclusory fashion, that trial counsel's failure to object to 
allegedly improper questioning by the prosecutor "unfairly 
prejudicfed] and inflamed the jury" (Br. of App. at 19). 
Defendant does not articulate how trial counsel's failure to 
object was prejudicial beyond his speculative and unsupported 
assertions that ,f[t]he only purpose the State had for eliciting 
[the evidence] was to appeal to, and arouse the jury's sense of 
horror," and "that the evidence was highly inflammatory in the 
eyes of the jury" (Br. of App. 20). Defendant's assertion of 
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prejudice fails to demonstrate that trial counsel's alleged 
deficiency so affected "the entire evidentiary picture" as to 
result in a different outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 696 (1984). 
As noted previously, defendant's credibility was a 
crucial issue at trial (R. 262, PT. 21, see Addendum B). 
Accordingly, the State presented overwhelming evidence of the 
lies defendant told to Lony's family, friends, and to law 
enforcement officers concerning Lony's whereabouts after the 
homicide (Tl. 33, T2. 246-47, 270-72, T3. 320-23, 342-44, 406-09, 
402-03). Additionally, even after admitting that he was 
responsible for Lony's death, defendant lied to investigating 
officers about where the homicide took place (Tl. 35-40, 71-79, 
81-84, 188-92). Further, the physical evidence does not support 
defendant's allegations of self defense (T2. 202-42). In light 
of the foregoing, introduction of arguably gruesome testimony 
concerning the realities entailed in moving Lony's decomposing 
corpse would not have affected the jury's verdict. Even without 
evidence of defendant's lack of credibility concerning the 
specific details of how he moved the corpse, the jury had 
substantial evidence from which to infer that defendant was not 
credible, and that his version of events was inconsistent with 
the physical evidence. Thus, defendant's allegation of prejudice 
is speculative and merely revisits witness credibility issues 




Based on the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <£ll day of December, 1992. 
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 J verdict of guilty, to make a finding as to firearms, if 
2
 J that is what the Court is making reference to. 
3
 I THE COURT: Fine. Then we'll be in informal 
* I recess. Counsel, you can leave the courthouse as long as 
J you're within ten minutes and can be reached by telephone 
6 J and we have those telephone numbers. All right, we'll be 
7 I in recess. 
8
 J [Whereupon, court was in recess pending the 
9 J return of the jury.] 
THE COURT: The State of Utah versus Terry Hay. 
Defendant is present, along with his counsel. Prosecution 
11 is present. It is 2:40. The jury has been deliberating 
13 about an hour. I was notified by a knock on the door 
14
 that counsel for the defendant wanted to have the benefit 
15 of the record for a motion. Go ahead. MS. 
16
 PALACIOS: Your Honor, we would have a motion for 
17
 mistrial, if I may state what occurred. 
18 After the jury was excused I discovered that 
19 Mr. Behrens had in his briefcase the knife with the black 
20
 handle and the red trim that was described by the 
21 J defendant during the course of his testimony. 
22
 THE COURT: Just a minute. Do you want to 
23
 J unshackle the defendant? 
24 TRANSPORTATION OFFICER: Fine. 
25
 MS. PALACIOS: I was advised that this was 
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1
 provided to me in the police reports. Quite frankly, I 
2
 can't dispute that at this point whether or not they were 
3 in the police reports. If they were in the police 
4
 J reports, then I believe that I would simply raise the 
issue for appeal purposes on the grounds of ineffective 
6 J assistance of counsel, because in my obvious haste to 
7 prepare for the trial — I was sick for three days, and 
8
 prepared over the weekend — I did not catch the fact 
9 J that that knife existed, which would corroborate my 
10 client's story. 
11
 However, I do base the grounds on the motion 
12 J for mistrial on prosecutorial misconduct. There was a 
13 black knife that was entered into evidence, evidence to 
14
 which I objected as being irrelevant because it was not 
15 the knife that was described by Mr. Hay. The Court 
16 allowed it in since it was found in the area. I think 
17
 that the prosecutor, having had access to that knife in 
18 his briefcase and knowing that he had that knife, while 
19 it may have been one thing to introduce that knife and 
20
 leave it up to me to do my job, I think it's quite 
21 I another thing to introduce another knife that he knew was 
22 I not the knife described, and was not relevant in the 
23
 I case. 
24 I think it has the effect of misleading the 
25
 I JurY# ancl I think it would have corroborated Mr. Hay's 
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1
 J version that he had thrown the knife from that area and 
2
 J that Mr. Crosby indeed had a knife, which was critical to 
3 J his self-defense. Otherwise, if there had not been a 
4
 knife offered, then maybe the knife would have been in 
5
 J the bag or some other place. 
6 I Those are the grounds upon which we make the 
7 motion. 
8
 I THE COURT: You stated all the reasons that you 
9 I believe constitute the significance of not having the 
10 knife? 
11
 MS. PALACIOS: I'm sorry? 
12 THE COURT: Have you stated all the reasons you 
13 believe have any significance for the motion based on 
14
 your not having access to the knife? 
15 MS. PALACIOS: I want to make it clear that the 
16 knife — I'm not alleging that they hid it from me. To 
17
 that extent I take responsibility. As I said, I think 
18 that I was ineffective not to do it. My concern is that 
19 J in raising and bringing in the knife, that was irrelevant 
20
 and knowing it was irrelevant, because they had the knife 
21 in the briefcase, misled the jury. Had they introduced 
22 the proper knife, or that knife, or both knives, because 
23
 J that was everything that they found there, for the jury 
24 to fairly consider. The existence of the knife 
25
 corroborates what Mr. Hay has said, and that is that he 
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1
 was attacked, the attacker fell, the knife fell, he 
2
 picked it up and threw it. And I think to that extent 
3 we're arguing self-defense and where his credibility is 
4
 I at issue. 
J In other words, there are things that he said 
6 J happened that they say didn't and to have something like 
7 J this is especially critical. 
8
 Mr. Scowcroft points out that we did not know 
9 that the knife existed. However, as I was — I can't 
10 remember where it was in the record. I can't remember if 
11
 I it was in the reports. They have represented to me that 
12 it was. I did not get the knife. I wasn't shown the 
13 knife, and I missed out on that part. However, again, I 
14
 just get back to the fact that this other knife was 
15 introduced, which it clearly didn't have any relevance. 
16
 THE COURT: Have you stated every reason now 
17
 J for the significance of your motion? 
18 MS. PALACI0S: I hope I have, Your Honor. 
19 Again, this is afterward. I think it's really hard at 
20
 I this juncture to tell what other possibilities or 
21 arguments I might have been able to make with respect to 
22 I that knife, but misleading the jury — 
23
 THE COURT: Well, I'm doing a lot of assuming. 
24 J I don't know what the purpose of putting that knife in 
was. If that knife — I don't know if it was to try to 
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see if Terry would lie and say that was the knife and 
then you say, wWe have got the real knife," and say you 
have lied about that. I don't know what purpose that 
could have served* And I think that I would have a much 
stronger argument to make to the jury regarding that if I 
could have shown that there was a knife that was tossed, 
as Mr. Hay said there was. And I think — I hope that's 
everything. 
THE COURT: Mr. Behrens? 
MR. BEHRENS: We had a knife, a black knife 
with a red handle here in evidence. It was being held in 
the Murray Police Department evidence room. I did not 
have — oh, let me back up. 
My understanding is that that knife was found 
down in that area during one of the searches in August or 
September and given to the Sanpete County Sheriff's 
Department. 
My understanding from Det. Anderson was that he 
received it from the Sanpete County Sheriff's Department. 
I didn't think I could lay a foundation as to where that 
knife was found without having somebody who found it here 
in court to testify. I didn't think that I could get it 
in through Det. Anderson simply because he was given that 
knife by someone else. 
I don't have it in front of me. I know that 
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1 knife is referred to in at least one or two police 
2
 reports, and I'm sure we displayed this in discovery, 
3
 I admitted the other knife because I knew there 
4 was evidence and testimony indicating that both Terry and 
5
 Lony had taken two knives apiece up there, and I didn't 
6 want to be — when I had Det. Anderson on the stand, I 
7 didn't want to be hiding a knife that I knew I could get 
8
 in through him. That's what I had him testify to, the 
9 shells and the knife that were found there. 
10 If I thought I could have gotten it in — and 
11 maybe you would have let me — in hindsight, I'm sure I 
12 would have admitted it through him then, but he couldn't 
13 testify as to where it was found, because he did not find 
14 it. 
15 I THE COURT: Why don't we have a stipulation and 
16 bring the jury back in and mark it and tell them? You 
17 can't have it both ways. You either want it in or want 
18 it out, and I don't think there's been anything corrupted 
19 in their deliberations. We can send it to them now with 
20 I a stipulation. 
21 MS. PALACIOS: I'm not trying to have things 
22 both ways, Judge. Let me — I actually think that the 
23 J motion for mistrial ought to be granted. However, if the 
24 I Court is going to deny my motion, then I would prefer 
25 I that the matter be cured in that manner. 
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1 I THE COURT: Well, I won't grant the motion for 
2
 I mistrial unless there's good ground for it. And if 
3 J there's a way to cure things, there's not good ground for 
4
 I a mistrial. 
5
 I MR. MACDOUGALL: There are a couple of problems 
6 I with trying to cure it. If we're bringing the jury back 
7 J inf they're being given another piece of evidence which 
® J obviously has significance. The other side is arguing to 
9 I the jury what the significance of that is. I don't 
10 J suppose we can get into the business of telling the jury 
11 which side had the knife and which side is producing the 
12 knife. 
13 THE COURT: No. 
14
 MR. MACDOUGALL: It's looking as though 
15 somebody was hiding something from the jury without any 
16 explanation. I kind of have a concern about trying to 
17
 give them a piece of evidence that unintentionally may 
18 cut either way or no way without any input as to how this 
19 I all came about. 
20
 J MS. PALACIOS: That's my concern. 
11 THE COURT: Wait a minute. We need to take out 
22 of this picture for now any reflection upon any of us as 
23
 I to why it didn't come in# because the purpose now is to 
24 I cure things. We can clean up any perceived damage to the 
25
 system that the system has, except something they should 
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1
 have had# and I'm not suggesting that did occur. That's 
2
 J not what I'm worried about at this time. 
3
 What I am worried about at this time is# 
4
 J assuming there's a problem, we have an opportunity to 
rectify it, and I think we ought to take that 
6
 I opportunity. One way of doing it is for each of you to 
7
 J think for 15 minutes or so about how you would use such 
evidence if it came in, and then to have you write out 8 
9
 J what you believe the significance of it is. And then if 
10 I
 w e could have a stipulation as to what it is, who found 
11
 \ it, or at least what agency found it, approximately when 
12 I and where, and then to just have counsel, in a very 
13 J dispassionate way, read to the jury their statement that 
everybody has seen before as to what significance that 
15 | particular counsel believes should be attributed to the 
16
 I knife, which will give you the opportunity to indicate to 
17
 Ms. Palacios that it's a point of consistency. 
IS J What do you believe? 
19
 I MR. MACDOUGALL: It bothers me there's still 
the inference that somebody was hiding something from the 
21 I jury, and that's not the case. If I were sitting on that 
22 J jury, I would think that the State hid that knife from 
us, and now it's come up and it's now being offered to us 
24 I and we're being toldmthat there's a piece of evidence 
25





 I And that, I don't think, they're entitled to 
2
 I draw that inference from what occurred. I'm certain that 
3 I there's no real way to purge that at this point. I guess 
4 J we can talk it over and see if there's any way to talk it 
5
 J over. 
6 MS. PALACIOS: I'm willing to talk it over and 
7 J try to cure it. 
8
 J THE COURT: We need to do that. I see your 
9 I point on that. You're saying it's not a matter of ego, 
10 it's a matter that they'll take sanctions in their 
11
 verdict against the State for what they perceive is the 
12 State's hiding of evidence. 
13 All right. Figure it out. I want to cure 
14
 1 this. We'll be in recess. I'll expect to hear from you 
15 in five or six minutes. 
16
 [Whereupon, court continued in recess at 2:50 
17
 to 3:25 p.m.] 
18 J THE COURT: Defendant is present, counsel are 
19 J present. This is State of Utah versus Terry Hay. 
20 Defendant is present, along with his counsel, counsel for 
21 J the prosecution is here, the jury is not. We're back on 
22 J the record to see if we have a solution to the problem. 
23
 MR. BEHRENS: I think we do. I think it's 
24 J agreeable to the parties that the Court will read a 
25
 statement to the jury which has been typed up here and 
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1
 then the State and defense have also typed up what they 
2
 have entitled State's Statement of Significance and 
3 Defense Statement of Significance and would ask the Court 
4 to read that to the jury. 
5
 J Contained in the explanation to the jury is a 
6 description of the knife, and we have marked it as 
7 State's Exhibit 43. We have also marked a diagram, which 
8
 is marked as State's Exhibit 42, on which there's a red 
9 ffxtf and that's described as the location where the knife 
10 was found in the instructions to the jury. 
11
 THE COURT: There's distances marked on that 
12 photographic exhibit? 
13 MR. BEHRENS: There are, Your Honor. 
14
 THE COURT: All right. And can you recall that 
15 exhibit corresponds, at least generally, to the two 
16 written ones that are already in evidence, if they want 
17
 I to compare them? 
18 J MR. BEHRENS: It does. As a matter of fact, 
19 the one might have made this particular exhibit. 
20
 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 J MS. PALACIOS: That's the agreement we have 
22 come to with respect to that. 
23
 THE COURT: All right. And assuming, without 
24 I conceding, Mr. Behrens, that there was a problem raised 
25
 I bY the motion, is it your belief this rectifies it? 
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1
 MR. BEHRENS: I believe it does, Your Honor. 
2
 THE COURT: Ms. Palacios? 
3 J MS. PALACIOS: Well, Your Honor, to be quite 
4
 I frank, I don't think it does, but given the opportunity 
5
 J to attempt to cure it, since the Court is not inclined to 
6 I grant my motion, I'm not going to pass up the 
7
 I opportunity. 
8
 THE COURT: All right. What is it that you 
9 I don't think it cures? 
MS. PALACIOS: Well, I just think that it would 
11
 I have been a lot more effective if I could have asked 
12 Terry to identify it, if I could have argued and gone on 
13 J and on about the credibility, just to that extent. 




15 J entitled to a perfect trial. Everyone is entitled to a 
16
 I fair trial. And in fact the way this has occurred may 
17
 J have been much more effective for your client than any 
18 J other way. The jury is going to look upon it as 
19 I something they never expected, either manna from heaven 
or elsewhere, and I think it could well be more effective 
21 I in your behalf because of the stipulation of the parties 
22 and my consideration of it. 
23
 Court denies the motion for a new trial. I'm 
24 I going to bring the jury in at this time and proceed as 
25
 I indicated. 
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 I THE COURT: The record should indicate that the 
4
 jury is now present. 
Members of the jury, we're going to do 
6 something a little bit out of the ordinary. I'm going 
7 to, at this time, receive Exhibits 42 and 43. 43 is a 
8
 knife; 42 is a map of the area of search, or the area 
9 I that we have been talking about in Sanpete County, with a 
10 designation of 42 on the map, with a red flXfl in the lower 
11
 left-hand side of the map indicating where the knife, 
12 Exhibit 43, was found. 
13 There was a knife in existence and neither 
14
 party established foundation for its admissibility into 
15 evidence during the trial proper. Both parties have 
16 agreed, however, that the knife should be admitted at 
17
 J this time for consideration by the jury in its 
18 deliberations. It's a knife with a black handle trimmed 
19 in red, found in late August or early September 1989, and 
20
 J marked as Exhibit 43-S by a member of the Sanpete Search 
21 J and Rescue organization, and found, as I indicated, at a 
22 place designated by the red ,fX,f on the diagram, which is 
23
 Exhibit 42-S. 
24 I The State claims the following from this 
25
 I evidence: This knife was located 121 feet south of where 
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1
 the cut boot was located. State contends this knife was 
2
 probably used to cut said boot. 
3
 The defendant claims the following from this 
4
 J evidence: That is, the knife matches Terry Hay's 
5
 J description of the knife used by Lony Crosby• The knife 
6 I was located south of the campsite where Lony Crosby was 
7 I shot. Terry Hay testified that he threw the knife to the 
8
 south. 
9 I Mr. Unsworth, would you take this evidence and 
10
 J treat it like the other evidence, and get it into the 
11
 J jury room? We're going to re-sequester you. We brought 
12 you in for a little breath of fresh air, and now we'll 
13 send you back to where we found you and you will again be 
14
 sequestered. 
15 Go ahead and take the jury, Mr. Unsworth. 
16
 [Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.] 
17
 THE COURT: All right. The record should 
18 1 indicate that the jury is now gone. I would suggest that 
19
 you just keep the defendant in the holding cell for 15 
20
 J minutes, in case there's any reaction from this or we get 
21 J any questions. And if, after 15 minutes, you haven't 
22 J heard anything from us, then I would just follow your 
23
 J usual practice, which I assume is down the elevator — 
24 I TRANSPORTATION OFFICER: We're only 30 feet 
25
 I from the elevator, even down in the jail. 
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THE COURT: I just don't want him sitting 
there with the cuffs biting into him while he is listening 
to a motion* 
All right. Mr. Scowcroft. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Your Honor/ we have made a motion to exclude evidence 
at the trial regarding allegations that Mr. hay transported 
the victim's remains approximately five to six weeks 
after the homicide. 
There are two grounds for this. First of all* 
we would argue that evidence of that nature is not relevant 
to the issues that need to be determined in this case. 
That's under Rule 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The reason it isn't relevant/ Your Honor/ is that we 
have stipulated to a number of evidentiary issues in 
this case. First of all/ we have stipulated to the site 
of the homicide. Second/ Terry has admitted having committed] 
the homicide. So I think we would all agree here that 
what we are really basically — the only real issue for 
the jury to determine here is his state of mind. We 
intend to raise a defense of justification/ that being 
self defense. 
Because this act of moving the victim's remains 
is alleged to have occurred five or six weeks after the 
homicide/ it is simply not probative of his state of 
14 
n / i A P r 
mind when the homicide took place five or six weeks earlier. 
If anything/ I would argue it reflects his state of mind 
when he moved the remains. 
Our second argument/ Your Honor/ is that if 
the court finds that this evidence is at all relevant 
the danger of prejudice/ confusion and misleading of 
the jury substantially outweighs any probative value 
that the evidence has. That comes under Rule 403 of 
the Rules of Evidence. The reason/ Your Honor/ is that 
it's inflammatory/ it's a gruesome act. For that reason/ 
if it is relevant^ and we don't believe it is relevant/ 
there is substantial danger that the jury will be misled 
and will form an attitude toward Terry that has really 
nothing to do with the criminal charge here/ that being 
homicide. 
We cited a case/ Your Honor/ State v. Mauer 
and I think maybe the court — we submitted the case 
and I believe the court — 
THE COURT: I tried it the second time. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes. So I don't need to 
talk a lot about that. But a couple of things that Mauer 
did. The Mauer court recognized that a — well/ in that 
case that Mr. Mauer's state of mind when he wrote the 
letter/ parts of which were excluded under Rule 403/ 
is independent and not necessarily probative of his state 
15 
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of mind when the homicide occurred. 
This is a similar case. Same charge* similar 
defense/ and I would argue on the basis of Mauer that 
the letter in the Mauer case/ that is* the speech of 
the defendant was certainly more probative of his state 
of mind in relation to the criminal charge than these 
alleged acts are here. And we would argue/ on the basis 
of Mauer that if that evidence was excludable/ then this 
evidence ought to excludable here. 
THE COURT: Mr. Behrens. 
MR. BEHRENS: Well/ the evidence in this 
case would show that the alleged homicide occurred on 
August 1st of '89/ and the remains were discovered on 
December 31 of 1989. In that five month period of time 
the State would allege and produce witnesses to show 
that the defendant made various statements as to what 
happened to the victim* and we will also show conduct 
which was inconsistent with the self defense theory that's 
been raised. 
It's our impression that the defendant went 
and moved the remains approximately three weeks after 
the homicide* and there is evidence to show that the 
condition of the remains was very decayed/ and it is 
a very gruesome act. I think the jury is entitled to 
hear/ first of all/ the explanation of how these remains 
16 
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came to be in Utah County, to begin with* because that's 
going to come out. That's how this whole case was discovered 
in the first place/ and to what lengths the defendant 
was willing to go to cover up the murder* the homicide* 
and also that he is attempting to conceal evidence of 
that homicide/ all of which would be inconsistent with 
his defense of self defense. 
It would be inconsistent with a claim of self 
defense. 
THE COURT: Do you have some case law 
to that effect? It seems to me that it's ambiguous/ 
that act/ at least as to the charge. I'm having some 
difficulty understanding the relevance of his movement 
of the remains and how that reflects upon the self defense 
theory. 
MR. BEHRENS: Because it reflects upon 
his credibility. Initially when he was questioned on 
this he made a statement that the homicide occurred in 
Murray* and that he moved the body to Utah Lake/ and 
now we have a stipulation that the homicide occurred 
in Sanpete County/ and again the body was still moved 
to Utah Lake. 
We have to be able to explain how the body 
was moved/ and it's inconsistent with the statements 
he's already made. 
17 
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He has made a number of — claimed a number 
of different versions as to what happened to the victim 
in this case/ this being one of them. I think we are 
entitled to present that to attack his credibility. 
THE COURT: Does your witness intend to 
testify? 
MS. PALACIOS: Mr. Hay? Yes. 
THE COURT: What about that/ Mr. Scoweroft? 
MR. SCOWCROFT: I still don't think this 
evidence has to come out. I think some inconsistent 
statements may come out if he takes the stand/ but I 
don't think it's correct to suggest that this evidence 
has to come out. 
THE COURT: Well/ no. I'm sayingi isn't 
it relevant as to his credibility/ and that is# that 
if he testifies/ then they can cross examine him about 
his propensity to tell the truth. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: I don't think that's necess-
arily so/ Your Honor. I think there are other possible 
explanations for that. 
For one thing/ a person experiencing denial 
and even remorse in actions of this kind could be consistent 
with those types of — with that type of conduct/ rather 
than with attempting to cover it up or lie. So I think 
there are other — 
18 
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1 THE COURT: I'm not suggesting/ at least 
2 right now/ that his actual movement of the body is 
3 inconsistent with his defense of self defense. That's 
4 not what I'm asking now* 
5 What I am asking: Isn't it relevant to the 
6 issue of credibility that he told — allegedly told one 
7 story about the body* how it got to wherever it got* 
3 and they have evidence that there is a different story 
9 indicating that he didn't tell the truth? 
10 And perhaps if he's not telling the truth then, 
11 perhaps he is not telling the truth on the stand? What 
12 about that? 
13 MR. SCOWCROFT: I think that could be 
14 so# and they are entitled to bring those things out. 
15 However/ I think we are in a situation where we have to 
15 balance Mr. Hay's rights to a fair trial under these 
17 rules. 
|g THE COURT: On the basis of what you just 
19 indicated to me/ the motion/ insofar as it depends on 
20 relevance/ is denied. 
2i Now/ we need to address 403. How do you intend, 
22 Mr. Behrens/ if the defendant takes the stand and if 
21 he testifies in such a way that it's appropriate for 
24 you to cross examine him as to the different stories 
25 I he told* it seems to me that we can run into a 403 problem 
19 
1 by the manner in which you proceed on that. 
2 Do you intend to just get into the issues that 
3 he moved the body/ period/ without any other grisly details 
4 of how he did it/ or anything like that? 
5 I MR. BEHRENS: In our case-in-chief* 
6 absolutely* because there's evidence found in Sanpete 
7 County that the act of homicide occurred there* and that 
8 the body was buried there and then moved from there later 
9 on-
10 As far as actually how it was accomplished/ 
11 or what not/ we don't have specific evidence as to that. 
12 I have got to go into that on cross examination. 
13 THE COURT: Is the only inflammatory portion 
14 that you're claiming/ Mr. Scowcroft* and that is* that 
15 the act happened* and that he/ Mr. Hay* moved the body? 
Ig Is that the only inflammatory thing you are claiming/ 
17 or is it in your concern about evidence about how he 
18 moved the body and the condition of the body at the time* 
19 and its decayed state? What is it you're concerned about? 
20 MR. SCOWCROFT: We are concerned about 
2i him having moved the body. 
22 THE COURT: Period. 
2| MR. SCOWCROFT: Right. We think that 
24 the State can avoid that issue and have plenty of evidence 
25 to proceed on* has many statements from Mr. Hay which 
20 
1 I think the State may argue are inconsistent. 
2 I do not think this is going to prejudice the 
3 State1s case/ and I think, as I said before/ we just 
4 have to balance the rights here. I don't think the State 
5 has been prejudiced* and I think that Mr. Hay would be* 
6 by bringing in evidence that bones were found in different 
7 locations. That's just not necessary to prove their 
g case. 
9 And of course that's a consequence of the body 
fO having been moved. If we exclude evidence that the body 
11 has been moved* then I believe we need to exclude evidence 
12 that bones were found in different places. 
13 I don't understand how that would prejudice 
14 the State's case. And I don't think it would have the 
15 effect of denying the State an opportunity to introduce 
15 into evidence prior inconsistent statements* if that 
17 is their intent. 
18 THE COURT: All right. I have previously 
19 determined that the evidence in question is relevant. 
20 And given the fact that what this case is going to be 
21 about is self defense* the credibility of Mr. Hay is 
22 not only relevant* but it is highly relevant. Rule 403 
2| requires that in order for evidence to be excluded* the 
24 probative value must be substantial* and I emphasize 
25 substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice 
21 
and other things. 
However* in this case the unfair prejudice 
is the only factor that's being raised. I'm not persuaded 
at this time that the probative value is substantially 
— and again I emphasize substantially — outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
If we were to get into the issue of some gruesome 
aspects of the movement of the body* my ruling would 
be otherwise. But what we have here is merely a question 
of whether or not the body was moved/ and if so# was 
it moved by Mr. Hay. 
And what did Mr. Hay — and what did Mr. Hay 
say about that on prior occasions. Because that's the 
limited issue/ the motion is denied. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you/ Your Honor. 
MS. PALACIOS: That's all we have at this 
time. 
THE COURT: Let's figure out what time 
we are going to start. We will start at 9:00 p.m. Excuse 
me/ 9:00 o'clock a.m. I thought we would get an early 
start on Monday. 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: There is one other matter/ 
Your Honor/ I wanted to — since Mr. Behrens and Mr. 
McDougal are here/ we wanted to provide Terry with some 




A. No, sir. 
Q. There was still parts of him showing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you say it was about six weeks later. 
Could it have been as short as three to four weeks 
later? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You think it was about a month and a half? 
A. (Witness nods head indicating affirmative.) 
Q. By this point you're up there in the middle 
of the night and you have got Lony's body, which has 
been decomposing for a month and a half; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's a terrible sight? 
A. I didn't look. 
Q. You didn't look? Did you notice anything 
about it? 
A. Just sleeping bag and dirt. 
Q. Well, there was a terrible smell, wasn't 
there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it was in an awful condition, wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 



























apart at various limbs and that type of thing, correct? 
A. Yes, it could have been. 1 
Q. Something might break apart? 
A. Probably could have, yes. 
Q. Okay. When you went to retrieve his body, 
you bent down to pull it out of the hole, you grabbed 
his heels and you tried to pull him out, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that what happened? 
A. Then I picked him up, yes. 
Q. When you pulled him out, his foot broke 
apart, didn't it? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You don't remember? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. If his foot broke apart, you would be sitting 
there holding the boot in your hand, correct? 
A. I didn't pay no attention. 
Q. You didn't pay no attention if you had his 
foot in your hand? 
A. No. 
Q. At that point it's possible, isn't it, that 
you wouldn't want to put your hand in that boot, 
correct? 
A. Yes, that would be. 
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Q. And so the likely thing to do may be to take 
a knife, cut the back of the boot open and take his 
foot out of the back by the sock, correct? 
A. No, sir* 
Q. That wouldn't be the likely thing to do? 
A. I don't know. I wouldn't do it. 
Q. Okay. If you were to do that, then, you 
could lay the foot down on top of him and throw the 
boot away; is that correct? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. These sideboards belonged to your father's 
truck, right? 
A. Yes, they do. 
Q. And he used them to haul firewood primarily, 
to extend the sides of the pickup? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when you drove down there, they were up 
so that firewood and things could be put in the truck; 
is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when you backed up the truck, possibly 
you went up and lopked at the body and discovered what 
condition it was, but you needed some type of a gurney 
or structure to get him off there, didn't you? 
A* No, sir. 
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1
 Q. Is it your testimony, then, that you actually 
2 J picked up a decomposing body that had been there six 
3 weeks and carried it 100 yards down a hill covered with 
4 dirt? 
5
 I A, Yes# sir, 
6 Q. Let me throw you a hypothetical then. Would 
7 it have been easier to knock — let me ask you this: 
8
 When they're put together right, these are all stapled 
9 together, right, at right angles like that? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Would it have been easier to knock one of the 
12 long ones off, break it apart and take it up the hill, 
13 then lay the sleeping bag on top of it? Wouldn't that 
14 have been easier? 
15 A. I don't know. 
16 I Q. Well, you indicate you carried it down the 
17 hill. Would it have been easier to have the sleeping 
18 bag laying on top of that and drag him down by hanging 
19 onto something like this, than it was to carry his body 
20 I on a sleeping bag covered with dirt 100 yards down that 
21 hill? That could have been easier, wouldn't it? 
22 A. It could have. 
23 Q. Okay. And it would have made it easier to 
24 I slide it into the back of the truck, right? 






 Q. When you got him into the truck, you threw 
2
 these two sideboards on top; is that correct? 
3
 A. Yes. 
4
 I Q. But when you got down there, all three of 
them were intact together. That's what you just 
6 I testified to; is that right? 
7
 I A. Yes. 
Q. So at some point you must have broken off 
9 I that other long one from these two, correct? 
10 I A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You did that to use it as a gurney? 
12 I A. I don't know, sir. 
13 \ Q. So you drive him up to the area west of Utah 
14
 J Lake and you grab hold of this — not this particular 
15 I one but one of these on that other sideboard — and 
pull him right out of the truck, correct? 
A. Yes. 
18 J Q# And everything that was there on top of him 
19
 I came with it. Basically, the sleeping bag and cans and 
trash and gloves and those things were just basically 
21 J junk in the back of your dad's pickup, correct? 
22 A. Yes. 
23
 Q. It all just came sliding out and landed on 
24 the ground. And what's the height of a pickup, maybe 
25




1 truck and take off; is that right? 
2
 A. Yes. Yes, sir. 
3 Q. Okay. 
4
 May I have a moment, please, Your Honor? 
5
 THE COURT: Yes. 
6 Q. (By Mr. Behrens) Now, let's go back before 
7 your trip to Wales. Basically, you and Lony and 
8
 I Jennifer were all good friends and you saw each other 
9 many times a week; is that right? 
10 A. Yes. 
11
 Q. And Jennifer and Lony would frequently break 
12 I up, sometimes once or twice a week for a couple days at 
13 a time; is that right? 
14
 A. Yes. 
15 J Q. Every time she broke up, she would come 
16 running to you and say, ,f0h, he treats me too bad. I 
17
 hate it when he does this and that," and you would feel 
18 sorry for her, right? Every time that would happen, 
19 J you would go out, go to movies, or go bum around, or go 
20 to the mall and stuff like that? 
21 A. Not every time, no. 
22 J Q. Some of the times then, maybe not every time? 
23 I And at times you would tell Jennifer that you loved 
24 I her, that you cared .about her; is that correct? 
25 I A. I just told her I felt sorry for her. 
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